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Abstract.	 This	 paper	 presents	 a	 framework	 to	 quantify	 failure	 propagation	 potential	 for	
complex,	cyber-physical	systems	(CCPSs)	during	the	conceptual	stages	of	design.	This	method	
is	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Function	 Failure	 Propagation	 Potential	 Methodology	 (FFPPM).	 This	
research	is	motivated	by	recent	trends	in	engineering	design.	As	systems	become	increasingly	
connected,	an	open	area	of	research	for	CCPSs	is	to	move	reliability	and	failure	assessments	
earlier	 in	 the	 engineering	 design	 process.	 This	 allows	 practitioners	 to	make	 decisions	 at	 a	
point	 in	 the	 design	process	where	 the	 decision	has	 a	 high	 impact	 and	 a	 low	 cost.	 Standard	
methods	are	 limited	by	the	availability	of	data	and	often	rely	on	detailed	representations	of	
the	 system.	 As	 such,	 they	 have	 not	 addressed	 failure	 propagation	 in	 the	 functional	 design	




standpoint,	 these	metrics	 quantify	 the	 reachability	 between	 functions	 in	 the	 graph	 and	 the	
number	of	paths	between	 functions	defines	 the	 failure	propagation	potential	of	 that	 failure.	
The	unique	 contribution	of	 this	 research	 is	 to	quantify	 failure	propagation	potential	 during	
conceptual	design	prior	 to	 selecting	 candidate	architectures.	The	goal	of	 these	metrics	 is	 to	




has	 become	 more	 prevalent.	 Expectations	 for	 system	 designs	 continue	 to	 be	 for	 higher	
performance	 at	 less	 cost.	 In	 addition,	 designers	 are	 forced	 to	 meet	 aggressive	 delivery	
schedules.	 As	 a	 result,	 systems	 often	 suffer	major	 reliability	 concerns.	 Consequently,	 it	 has	
become	 well	 known	 that	 making	 correct	 early	 design	 decisions	 offers	 several	 advantages	
including	reduced	design	and	analysis	cost,	increased	freedom	to	make	decisions	that	have	a	







Traditional	 failure	 propagation	 techniques	 lack	 a	 comprehensive	 ability	 to	 analyze	 the	
propagation	of	failures	in	the	conceptual	design	of	complex,	cyber-physical	systems	(CCPSs).	
By	 their	 nature,	 CCPSs	 have	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 connectedness	 (e.g.,	 networks,	 automation	
equipment,	 etc.),	 and	 therefore	 have	 significant	 risk	 of	 failure	 propagating	 throughout	 the	
systems.	Well-developed	 physics-based	models	 that	 contain	 simultaneous	 equation	 solvers	
allow	analysis	 of	 both	 forward	 and	backward	 failure	propagation,	which	propagate	 failures	
either	with	or	against	the	nominal	flows	in	the	functional	block	diagram	(FBD).	However,	 in	
the	 earliest	 stages	 of	 engineering	 design	 where	 detailed	 physics-based	 models	 are	 not	
available,	 existing	 failure	 analysis	 methods	 seek	 only	 to	 forward	 propagate	 failures.	 While	
forward	propagation	is	a	major	element	of	how	failures	propagate,	backward	propagation	and	
also	propagation	across	uncoupled	subsystem	boundaries	can	have	significant	impacts	on	the	
system.	 In	 this	 research,	we	 seek	 to	model	 failure	propagation	during	 conceptual	design	by	
using	FBDs	and	graph	theory	with	the	goal	of	describing	the	behavior	of	how	propagation	can	
occur	before	physics-based	simulators	are	available.		
Graph	 theory	 is	 used	 to	 quantify	 attributes	 of	 a	 system	 including	 connectedness	 and	
reachability.	Directed	graphs	are	used	to	model	the	system	where	edges	represent	flows	(e.g.,	
material,	 energy,	 and	 signal)	 and	 nodes	 represent	 functions.	 The	 reachability	 matrix	 R(G)	
defines	 the	 reachability	 of	 a	 failure	 between	 any	 connected	 functions.	 To	 gather	 relevant	
failures,	we	present	and	then	implement	Function	Failure	Rate	Design	Method	(FFRDM).	This	
method	uses	 a	 novel	 structuring	 of	 the	design	process	 to	 share	 information	 from	historical	
failures	 to	 early	 points	 in	 the	 design	 process.	 For	 a	 specific	 failure	 mode,	 the	 reachability	




Early	 design	 failure	 analysis	 has	 become	 a	 thrust	 area	 in	 research	 related	 to	 CCPSs	 and	
reliability	engineering.	Identifying	and	mitigating	failures	in	early	design	has	been	addressed	
by	 several	 methods	 in	 literature.	 Failure	 Modes	 Effects	 and	 Criticality	 Analysis	 (FMECA)	
quantifies	a	failure	mode’s	criticality	and	likelihood	against	the	system	[2].	Failure	Modes	and	
Effects	Analysis	(FMEA)	extends	FMECA	by	including	a	failure	mode’s	likelihood	of	detection	




methods	 provide	 a	 foundation	 for	 many	 failure	 methods,	 there	 are	 several	 limitations	
including	 intensity	of	manual	 labor,	usability	during	 functional	design,	and	 informality.	As	a	




FLAME	 and	WIFA	 reduce	 high	 user	workload	 by	 using	 an	 archived	 knowledge	 base.	WIFA,	
AFMEA,	and	CFMA	indicate	the	physical	cause	of	the	failure	and	are	practical	for	mechanical	
systems	 while	 FLAME	 is	 not.	 However,	 FLAME,	 CFMA,	 and	 AFMEA	 can	 be	 used	 during	
functional	design.	A	major	 limitation	 to	 these	methods	 is	 that	 they	do	not	use	 a	 formalized	
failure	language	to	accurately	and	consistently	define	failure	modes.	One	answer	to	this	is	the	
Function	Failure	Design	Method	(FFDM),	which	uses	a	formalized	failure	language	to	improve	
the	 automation	 of	 identifying	 failure	 modes	 and	 improving	 scalability	 to	 complex	 systems	




of	 a	 system	prior	 to	 formal	 architecture	being	defined.	While	 these	methods	 encourage	 the	
early	discovery	of	failures,	they	are	unable	to	address	the	propagation	of	failures.		
Probabilistic	Risk	Assessment	(PRA)	was	developed	partially	in	response	to	the	shortcomings	
of	 FMEA	 and	 FMECA	 [14].	 A	 failure	 probability	 can	 be	 calculated	 via	 fault	 and	 event	 tree	
modeling	 of	 a	 system	 [15].	 PRA	 and	 its	 extensions	 are	 heavily	 used	 in	 the	 aerospace	 and	
nuclear	power	industries	[16].	While	PRA	informally	models	failure	propagation	through	the	




architecture	 is	 defined	 [17].	 This	 is	 done	 by	 propagating	 failures	 through	 the	 system	 and	
results	in	the	system’s	functional	health.	Work	by	O’Halloran	et	al.	models	failure	propagation	
across	 uncoupled	 boundaries	 [18]	 in	 early	 conceptual	 designs.	 These	 advances	 investigate	
failure	 propagation	 once	 components	 have	 been	 selected.	 The	 proposed	 method	 in	 this	
research	is	used	to	quantify	the	propagation	of	failures	in	a	purely	functional	architecture.		
The	summary	of	related	research	clarifies	the	lack	of	reliability-based	methods	applicable	to	
conceptual	 design.	 Those	 that	 do	 exist	 primarily	 focus	 on	 aspects	 of	 reliability	 other	 than	
propagation	 of	 failures.	 As	 a	 result,	 this	 research	 focuses	 on	 the	 quantification	 of	 failure	
propagation	potential	in	FBDs.		
Methodology 
This	 section	 explains	 the	 tenets	 of	 the	 proposed	 Function	 Failure	 Propagation	 Potential	
Method	 (FFPPM).	 To	 accomplish	 this,	 an	 example	 system	 of	 a	 Pressurized	 Water	 Reactor	
(PWR)	 is	 presented.	 Basic	 explanations	 for	 functional	 modeling	 and	 graph	 theory	 are	
provided.	The	method	contains	the	following	steps:	1)	Functional	Block	Diagrams	(FBDs)	are	
expressed	as	graphs	using	the	fundamentals	of	graph	theory.	2)	Since	functions	can	be	linked	
to	 failures,	 and	 flows	 to	 behavior	 variables,	 we	 establish	 a	 process	 to	 determine	 the	






paths	 between	 nodes	 i	 and	 j.	 These	 metrics	 are	 intended	 to	 be	 developed	 as	 derived	
requirements	during	conceptual	design.		
	
3.1 Functional Modeling.	 The	 development	 of	 functional	 modeling	 has	 become	 a	




at	 a	 subsequent	 step	 in	 design.	 A	 system	 boundary	 delineates	 the	 border	 between	 the	
functions	included	in	the	system	and	functions	that	are	outside	the	system	boundary.	External	




describe	 FBDs.	 Use	 of	 a	 common	 language	 allows	 a	 FBD	 to	 be	 consistently	 developed,	
well-defined,	 and	 to	 leverage	 design	methods	 and	 automation	 techniques.	 As	 a	 part	 of	 the	
FBED	 common	 language,	 FBDs	 use	 material,	 energy,	 and	 signal	 flows	 to	 describe	 the	
connection	of	functions.	To	demonstrate	the	proposed	methodology,	an	example	FBD	design	
model	of	a	PWR	Emergency	Core	Cooling	System	(ECCS)	is	presented	(see	Figure	2).	It	should	
be	 noted	 that	 while	 the	 PWR	 ECCS	 example	 is	 representative	 of	 such	 systems	 found	 on	






3.2 Constructing Functional Graphs.	 Graph	 theory	 is	 a	 well-developed	 field	 in	mathematics	
originated	 by	 Euler	 in	 1735	 [20].	 Graphs	 are	models	 that	 contain	 nodes	 and	 edges,	 where	
edges	are	used	to	connect	nodes.	A	node	can	be	connected	to	any	other	node	including	itself.	
Edges	 can	 contain	direction	 (directed	 graphs)	 or	no	direction	 (undirected	 graphs).	 Further,	
edges	can	contain	weight	representing	the	strength	or	importance	of	the	connection.		












3.3 Proposed Functional Failure Propagation Types.	 In	 this	 research,	we	propose	 three	 types	
of	 failure	propagation:	1)	 forward	propagation,	2)	backward	propagation,	and	3)	uncoupled	
boundary	 propagation.	 Each	 of	 these	 failure	 propagations	 behave	 differently,	 and	 are	
explicitly	modeled	using	the	method	presented.	In	all	failure	propagation	types,	an	initiating	
failure	begins	the	propagation.	Figure	4	depicts	an	overview	of	the	failure	propagation	types	
where	the	red,	solid	 line	represents	 the	flow	of	 the	 failure.	The	top	 left	side	of	Figure	4	 is	a	













propagation	where	a	 failure	propagates	 from	the	failed	 function	to	the	next	 function	 in	 line.	
This	 propagation	 is	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 flow	 for	 flows	 that	 exist	 in	 the	 nominal	 FBD.	 In	
Figure	4	(top	right),	where	function	5	has	 failed,	 the	effect	flows	out	of	 function	5	along	the	
existing	energy	flows.		
2.	Backward	propagation.	Backward	propagation	is	less	common	and	not	always	analyzed	in	




functions	 interact	 unexpectedly.	 In	 this	 scenario,	 failures	 propagate	 between	 functions	 that	




To	 demonstrate	 the	 three	 propagation	 types,	 consider	 the	 following	 example.	 While	 the	
proposed	 FFPPM	 applies	 to	 functional	 designs,	 this	 example	 uses	 a	 physical	 architecture.	
Consider	leaking	in	a	pipe	where	the	pipe	exists	as	part	of	a	larger	system.	Leaking	in	this	pipe	
causes	a	reduced	throughput	of	fluid,	and	a	reduction	in	the	fluid	pressure.	The	reduction	in	
throughput	 is	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 flow	 rate	 (forward	 propagation)	 while	 the	 pressure	
occurs	throughout	the	fluid	(both	forward	and	backward	propagation).	While	this	appears	to	
be	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 failure	mode’s	 effect,	 the	 other	 aspect	 depends	 on	 the	 location	 of	 the	
leaking	pipe	relative	to	the	remainder	of	the	system.	There	are	many	components	which	are	
affected	 by	 fluid,	 namely	 electronics.	 In	 cases	 where	 electronics	 are	 submerged,	 contact	 a	




3.4 Developing Failure Propagation Flows.	 Generating	 new	 connections	 in	 the	 functional	
graph	 requires	 several	 aspects	 to	 be	 considered.	 First,	 a	 set	 of	 initiating	 failures	 is	 used	 to	
determine	the	failures	that	occur.	Our	prior	work	is	used	to	identify	functional	failures	[21].	
The	 Function	 Failure	 Rate	 Design	Method	 (FFRDM)	 developed	 a	 knowledge	 base	 to	 relate	
functions	directly	to	failure.	The	knowledge	base	of	functions	to	failure	is	comprised	of	36,700	










By	 presenting	 the	 FBD	 as	 a	 graph,	 forward	 and	 backward	 failure	 propagation	 paths	 are	
implicitly	present.	More	specifically,	failures	can	potentially	propagate	along	any	flow	that	is	
present	 in	 the	 graph,	 in	 either	 direction.	 Failures	 may	 also	 propagate	 along	 undiscovered	






in	 this	 research,	 failures	 are	 known	 to	 be	 physics-based	when	 emerging	 in	 the	 system	 and	
often	affect	only	a	portion	of	the	flow.	As	such,	the	mechanism	to	model	the	propagation	paths	




To	 accomplish	 the	modeling	 of	 new	 failure	 propagation	 paths	 using	 behavior	 variables,	we	
propose	a	set	of	behavior	variables	 for	each	flow	in	the	FBED.	A	set	of	 these	variables	were	
previously	 proposed	 alongside	 the	 FBED	 [19].	 However,	 the	 original	 work	 proposed	 only	








Given	 the	 list	 of	 behavior	 variables	 in	 Figure	 6,	 each	 failure	 in	 Figure	 5	 is	 assessed.	 This	
assessment	determines	all	behavior	variables	affected	by	a	specific	failure.	In	this	case,	as	with	
all	analyses,	expert	knowledge	of	the	failure	and	similar	systems	is	relevant.		
To	 demonstrate	 this	 process,	 corrosion	 is	 used	 as	 an	 example	 to	 generate	 a	 new	 failure	
propagation	 path.	 Failure	 propagation	 connections	 in	 the	 FBD	 are	made	 by	 connecting	 the	
identified	failure	to	affected	behavior	variables.	As	shown	in	Figure	5,	the	function	distribute	
liquid	is	connected	to	this	failure.	Corrosion	leads	to	pitting,	voids,	and	cracks	in	the	material.	
The	 purpose	 of	 distributing	 liquid	 is	 to	 direct	 liquid	 to	multiple	 locations	 based	 on	 one	 or	
more	inputs.	This	failure	therefore	leads	to	leaking	and	has	several	failure	propagation	effects.	
First,	 reduced	 liquid	 volume	 (i.e.,	 behavior	 variable	 V)	 is	 distributed	 to	 subsequent	
components.	Second,	the	pressure	(i.e.,	behavior	variable	P)	to	move	liquid	is	also	reduced	in	
the	 forward	 and	 backward	 direction.	 Third,	 the	 leaked	 liquid	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 interfere	




The	previously	mentioned	 leaking	pipe	example	 is	used	 to	demonstrate	 failure	propagation	
types	using	an	example	with	real	architecture.	This	example	indicates	that	not	all	failure	paths	














3.	 Failure	 propagation	 paths	 that	 are	 unlikely	 to	 occur	 have	 a	 weight	 equal	 to	!	/2	 of	 the	
failure.		
	
Beyond	 these	 three	 types	 of	 weights,	 we	 determine	 how	 those	 values	 (i.e.,	!	or	!	/2)	 are	
distributed	 across	 the	 entire	 failure	 propagation	 path.	 This	 applies	 to	 Types	 2	 and	 3;	 a	








However,	 this	 approach	 does	 not	 model	 reality	 since	 failures	 do	 not	 weaken	 with	 longer	
propagation	 paths.	 The	motivation	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 inform	 designers	 on	 how	 produce	
systems	 that	 are	 robust	 to	 failure	 propagation.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 selected	 approach	 is	 to	
distribute	 the	!	to	 each	 function	 that	 is	 affected	 by	 a	 specific	 failure	 propagated.	 This	
promotes	 reducing	 the	 length	 of	 propagated	 failures	 and	 meets	 the	 goal	 of	 this	 research.	







3.5 Quantifying Graph Failure Propagation Potential. The	 graph’s	 connectedness	 is	 the	
baseline	 knowledge	 for	 how	 failures	 are	 propagated.	 We	 propose	 two	 metrics	 to	 quantify	
failure	 propagation	 potential	 using	 graph	 connectedness.	 The	 first	 is	 determined	 using	 the	
reachability	 matrix,	 R(G).	 A	 cell	 Xi,	 j	 in	 R(G)	 represents	 the	 number	 of	 steps	 required	 to	
traverse	 the	graph	 from	node	 i	 to	node	 j.	 In	 this	 case,	nodes	 represent	 functions	within	 the	
system	model.	An	example	R(G)	 is	presented	 in	Figure	9.	 In	 this	example,	 is	 shows	 that	7.1	







To	understand	 the	 relative	difference	 in	 failure	propagation	potential	 between	 the	nominal	
FBD	 and	 the	 FRB	where	 failure	 propagation	 flows	 has	 been	 added,	we	 quantify	 theoretical	
minimum	and	maximum	values.	The	minimum	value,	which	is	associated	with	a	high	degree	
of	 failure	propagation,	 is	 found	by	using	 a	 complete	 graph	with	 the	 same	number	of	 nodes	
(i.e.,	n=14	for	the	PWR	example).	In	a	complete	graph,	each	node	is	connected	to	every	other	
node	 in	 the	 graph.	 Thus,	 a	 failure	 is	 transmitted	 to	 every	 other	 function	 of	 the	 system	 in	 a	
single	step.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	maximum	value	 is	 found	by	using	a	ring	graph.	 In	a	ring	
graph,	 there	 are	 connections	 between	 each	 node	 and	 the	 adjacent	 node.	 To	 quantify	 one	


























While	 the	 two	 metrics	 contain	 similar	 information,	 the	 following	 example	 motivates	 the	
inclusion	of	both.	In	the	graph	shown	in	Figure	12,	there	are	many	paths	between	function	2	
and	8.	For	example,	some	of	the	shorter	paths	are	[2	5	8],	[2	4	8],	and	[2	4	7	8].	While	the	first	










The	 metrics	 developed	 from	 this	 research	 can	 be	 used	 by	 systems	 designers	 to	 identify	
potential	 short	 failure	 paths	 that	 exist	within	 the	 system.	The	number	 of	 functions	 (nodes)	
shown	 in	Figure	9	 is	 indicative	of	 the	probability	 that	a	 failure	 in	one	 function	can	 traverse	
through	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 system	 to	 reach	 another	 function.	 Another	 useful	 outcome	 of	 this	
research	is	the	number	of	failure	paths	between	functions,	shown	in	Figure	11.	Functions	with	
many	 pathways	 between	 them	 have	 a	 higher	 probability,	 when	 all	 propagation	 paths	 are	
equally	likely	to	occur,	as	compared	to	functions	with	few	pathways	between	them.	However,	
functions	with	few	pathways	between	them	may	also	be	 indicative	of	critical	flow	pathways	
[23].	 Critical	 flow	 pathways	 with	 few	 or	 no	 redundancy	 could	 then	 be	 redesigned	 with	
additional	 redundancy	 or	 risk	 mitigation	 may	 be	 imposed	 via	 other	 means	 (e.g.,	 high	
reliability	safety	system	designation,	reduced	reliance	on	critical	flow	path,	etc.).	
The	 authors	 note	 several	 assumptions	made	 in	 this	 research.	 First,	 propagated	 failures	 are	
modeled	as	sudden	and	complete.	The	first	result	of	this	is	that	partial	failures	are	not	being	
investigated.	 Further,	 the	 time-based	 element	 of	 failure	 propagation	 is	 not	 modeled.	 A	
propagation	 path	 can	 go	 through	 a	 function	 that	 slowly	 degrades,	 and	 in	 this	 paper,	 the	





This	paper	presents	a	 framework	to	quantify	 failure	propagation	potential	 for	CCPSs	during	
the	conceptual	stages	of	design.	Specifically,	three	types	of	failure	propagation	are	proposed:	
forward,	backward,	 and	uncoupled.	Current	modeling	of	 failure	propagation	does	not	 cover	
these	 most	 of	 the	 these	 types.	 Further,	 these	 are	 traditionally	 ignored	 entirely	 during	
functional	 design.	 With	 the	 inclusion	 of	 failure	 propagation	 paths	 to	 the	 FBD,	 metrics	 are	
proposed	to	quantify	the	failure	propagation	potential	for	FBDs.	To	develop	the	metrics,	graph	
theory	is	used	to	model	the	connectedness	of	the	FBD	and	the	reachability	of	one	function	to	
another.	 Directed	 graphs	 are	 used	 to	 model	 the	 system	 where	 edges	 represent	 flows	 (i.e.,	
	
material,	 energy,	 and	 signal)	 and	 nodes	 represent	 functions.	 The	 reachability	 matrix	 R(G)	
defines	the	reachability	of	a	failure	between	any	connected	functions.		
For	a	specific	failure	mode,	the	reachability	matrix	indicates	the	propagation	potential	of	that	
failure.	 The	 metrics	 proposed	 in	 this	 research	 are	 (1)	 the	 summation	 of	 the	 reachability	
matrix	and	 (2)	 the	 summation	of	 the	number	of	paths	between	nodes	 i	 and	 j	 for	all	 i	 and	 j.	
These	metrics	are	intended	to	be	developed	as	requirements	during	conceptual	design.	
Future Work 









Further,	 an	 important	 aspect	 for	 methodologies	 is	 their	 scalability	 to	 large	 systems.	 The	
presented	analysis	of	the	FBD	would	present	challenges	when	applied	to	systems	with	a	large	
number	of	 functions.	As	a	result,	 the	authors	plan	to	 formalize	 the	approach	with	dedicated	
rules	such	that	the	process	to	add	failure	propagation	flow	can	be	automated.		
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